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ABSTRACT
The right to an effective remedy for victims of human rights abuses
perpetrated by companies remains weak in international law. A host
of substantive and procedural legal issues prevent victims from seek-
ing redress in national and international courts. This problem is par-
ticularly acute where victims seek redress for abuses perpetrated by
private military and security companies. The nature of these compa-
nies’ activities and their regular deployment overseas makes it difficult
to hold them accountable for human rights abuses. This article exam-
ines whether non-judicial mechanisms can provide effective remedies
against these private military and security companies for their human
rights abuses where judicial remedies have failed. The article estab-
lishes the parameters of an effective remedy under international
human rights law and proceeds to assess whether two specific exam-
ples of non-judicial remedies, the International Code of Conduct
Association for Private Security Providers’ grievance mechanism and
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
National Contact Point system, offer human rights-compliant
remedies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“U.N.
Guiding Principles”) have swiftly established themselves as the leading
global instrument on business and human rights.3 The U.N. Guiding Prin-
ciples are based around three pillars: the state’s responsibility to protect
human rights, the corporation’s responsibility to respect human rights,
and the shared burden of states and businesses to provide remedies
where rights have been infringed.4 While the operations of businesses
have spread to a global scale, the regulation of their activities has failed
to keep pace with this expansion.5 The third pillar, the responsibility to
3 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises),
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21,
2011) [hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles].
4 Id. at ¶ 6.
5 See Larry Cata Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations “Protect-Respect-
Remedy Project”: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global
Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 37, 41 (2011) (“Economic
enterprises are increasingly able to arrange their activities beyond the regulatory
scope of any organization”); GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS
TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS 1 (2013), http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Ac
cess-to-Judicial-Remedies-for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business
.pdf.
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provide remedies, in particular, remains weak. We are slowly confronting
the reality that the remedial structures available in national, supra-
national, and international courts are incapable of providing effective
remedies for victims of human rights abuses perpetrated by businesses
within and outside the jurisdiction of the states in which the businesses
are domiciled.6
The state-centric focus of International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”)
has created a number of problems for lawyers trying to hold businesses
accountable for human rights abuses. As international human rights law
treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”),
impose obligations on states,7 the treaties lack direct horizontal effect and
can only influence the conduct of private individuals and legal persons
indirectly.8 This means that, normally, individuals cannot invoke the
rights in these treaties directly against businesses, as businesses are not
the subjects of the treaty obligations.9 As a result, courts like the Euro-
6 SKINNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 8. R
7 At the European Court of Human Rights, for example, the alleged violation of
the Convention must have been committed by a Contracting State or be in some way
attributable to it. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 35(3)(a), [hereinafter
European Convention on Human Rights]. Nonetheless, it is possible for the acts of
private persons or companies to be attributed to states and for liability to arise that
way. See, e.g., Yasa v. Turkey, App. No. 22495/93, 1998-VI 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, ¶
53 (1998); Akkoc¸ v. Turkey, App. Nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, 2000-X 34 Eur. H. R.
Rep. 51, ¶¶ 77-78 (2000); Ineta Ziemele, Human Rights Violations by Private Persons
and Entities: The Case-Law of International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring
Bodies 15 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Acad. Eur. Law, Working Paper No. 2009/8, 2009);
Wolfgang Kaleck & Miriam Saage-Maass, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights
Violations Amounting to International Crimes, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 710 (2010).
8 DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 21-24 (3d ed. 2014); CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 180
(1993). The same goes for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as
the Human Rights Committee noted in General Comment No. 31: “The article 2,
paragraph 1, obligations are binding on States [Parties] and do not, as such, have
direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law.” U.N. Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States
Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004).
These treaties can influence the conduct of private individuals through positive
obligations arising from the substantive rights therein. Thus states may be obliged to
investigate human rights abuses perpetrated by companies and to protect people
within their jurisdiction from harm caused by third parties. See, e.g., Guerra v. Italy,
App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, ¶ 60 (1998); Vilnes v. Norway, App. Nos.
52806/09 and 22703/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (judgment of December 5, 2013 ¶ 161); Lopez
Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90, 1994 Eur. H.R. Rep. 46, ¶ 51 (1994).
9 It is interesting to note that human rights were not always conceived of as state-
centric obligations. Note, for example, the reference to every organ of society striving
to realize the protections in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights:
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN103.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-FEB-17 13:08
72 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:69
pean Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the courts of the states that
have ratified the ECHR grant judicial remedies that are ill-suited to pro-
viding redress to victims of businesses that have committed human rights
abuses.10
John Ruggie observed that victims of businesses seeking redress in
their home country’s judicial system face extensive obstacles.11 At the
national level, tort law has provided some remedies against businesses for
human rights abuses.12 The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),13 for example,
has previously been described as “the main engine for transnational
human rights litigation in the U.S.”14 However, in the case of Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, which normally applies to U.S.
domestic legislation, applies to the ATS.15 Although the full conse-
quences of the Kiobel judgment for transnational human rights litigation
[T]his Universal Declaration of Human Rights [is] a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive
by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and
effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
10 Steering Comm. for Human Rights (CDDH), Draft Preliminary Study on
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Field of Human Rights: Existing Standards and
Outstanding Issues, Doc. No. CDDH(2012)012 (2012), at 10.
11 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises),
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶¶ 89-90, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(Apr. 7, 2008).
12 Many human rights violations may be pursued as intentional torts, although tort
does not provide a cause of action for all human rights violations. See Roger P.
Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation after Kiobel 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1749, 1750 (2014); Youseph Farah, Toward a Multi-Directional Approach to Corporate
Accountability, in CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 27, 42-43 (Sabine Michalowski ed., 2014).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
14 Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and
the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 601 (2013).  For a review of the history
of the ATS, see generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011).
15 “It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S. .’” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). See Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 144-45 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS), aff’d 569 U.S. ____ (2013).
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against companies are still unclear,16 lower federal courts have generally
interpreted Kiobel as forbidding all suits based solely on tortious conduct
that occurred overseas,17 thus reducing the ATS’s utility in holding trans-
national corporations accountable for human rights abuses.
Even where a cause of action is available in tort law within the national
legal system, a host of other issues can make seeking remedies in the
national legal system less attractive. Two pervasive problems for non-
national litigants are the principle of separate legal personality and the
forum non conveniens doctrine. The principle of separate legal personal-
ity makes it difficult to hold parent companies responsible for the actions
of their subsidiaries because each is a separate legal entity.18 A parent
company is unlikely to be held responsible for the acts of its subsidiary
unless certain exceptions apply.19 Further barriers exist in the U.S., where
general allegations of a parent’s participation in tortious actions will not
be sufficient to ground a claim against a parent company for the actions
of its subsidiary, leading to the dismissal of cases for lack of a cause of
action.20 The forum non conveniens doctrine can also prevent a case from
moving forward in some common law jurisdictions when another jurisdic-
tion is considered by the court to be more suitable or appropriate.21 This
may be the case where a tort takes place outside the jurisdiction in which
the company is domiciled, which is often the case where a Private Mili-
tary and Security Company (“PSC”) has staff deployed abroad. This doc-
See generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998).
16 Some are optimistic that the judgment leaves the door open for further
litigation. See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The
Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1773 (2014).
Others consider that the effective result of Kiobel is to severely limit ATS litigation in
the United States. See Alford, supra note 12, at 1749. R
17 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014);
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2013).
18 “The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the
memorandum; and though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers and the same hands
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent for the subscribers or trustees
for them. Nor are the subscribers as members in any shape or form, except to the
extent and in the manner provided by the Act.” Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd
[1897] AC 22 (HL) 51.
19 OXFORD PRO BONO PUBLICO, OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE AND REDRESS FOR
VICTIMS OF CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE 323 (2008), http://www2.law.ox.ac
.uk/opbp/Oxford-Pro-Bono-Publico-submission-to-Ruggie-3-Nov-2008.pdf.
20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
21 In Spiliada v. Cansulex, the House of Lords stated “the question is not one of
convenience, but of the suitability or appropriateness of the relevant jurisdiction.”
[1987] AC 460 (HL) 474.
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trine applies in the U.S.,22 Canada,23 and Australia.24 The U.N. Guiding
Principles also specifically note that the costs of litigation could pose a
practical barrier where the cost of bringing claims exceeds its purpose as
an appropriate deterrent to unmeritorious cases and/or where the costs of
litigation cannot be reduced to reasonable levels through Government
support, “market-based” mechanisms (such as litigation insurance and
legal fee structures), or other means.25
As judicial remedies have faltered, there is scope for non-judicial reme-
dial mechanisms to assume the mantle and provide effective remedies.
The U.N. Guiding Principles recognize the value that non-judicial reme-
dies can have in providing an important complement and supplement to
judicial remedies.26 This is especially true where issues arise between
businesses and individuals that have not yet reached the threshold of a
legal dispute, but still warrant appropriate resolution before they become
more serious.27 This article seeks to determine whether non-judicial rem-
edies can provide effective remedial mechanisms for victims of human
rights abuses perpetrated by PSCs.
There are a number of challenging problems with seeking to remedy
PSCs’ human rights abuses. PSCs perform activities and act in environ-
ments that are substantially different from those of most other businesses,
thus creating a unique scope for human rights violations.28 During the
Iraq War (2003-2009), for example, PSC contractors became embroiled in
22 Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F.Supp. 61, 63-65 (S.D.Tex. 1994); see David W.
Robertson, Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: An Object Lesson in
Uncontrolled Discretion, 29 TEX. INT’L L. J. 353, 372-73 (1994).
23 Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. Am. Mobile Satellite, [2002] 4 SCR 205, 208-09 (Can.).
24 Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills Pty. Ltd. (1990) 171 CLR 538, 590 (Austl.).
European Union legislation has severely limited the application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine in the United Kingdom. See Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in
International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos
Case, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 12-13 (2001).
25 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex §§ II.B.23-II.B.24; Skinner et R
al., supra note 5, at 54. R
26 Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and
their Stakeholders 7 (Corp. Social Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of
Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 41, 2008).
27 Jonathan Drimmer & Lisa Laplante, The Third Pillar: Remedies, Reparations,
and the Ruggie Principles, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE:
MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 316, 318 (Jena Martin & Karen Bravo eds.,
2015).
28 WOLFGANG BENEDEK ET AL., REPORT ON ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF
EU INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBER STATES, NGOS, IFIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS, TO MORE EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH, AND MONITORING OF, THE
ACTIVITIES OF NON-STATE ACTORS, 64 (2015), http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/
materiale/reports/14-Deliverable-7.2.pdf; PMSCs are more likely to commit human
rights violations than violations of IHL as they are more likely to be deployed in post-
conflict situations. Nigel D. White, The Privatisation of Military and Security
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a number of human rights abuses directly related to their work.29 In one
instance, PSC contractors hired to interrogate detainees at Abu Ghraib
allegedly ordered and participated in the torture, inhuman, and degrading
treatment of detainees.30 In another instance, PSC contractors responsi-
ble for escorting diplomats through Baghdad shot a number of unarmed
Iraqi civilians.31 Four of the contractors were subsequently convicted of
charges ranging from first-degree murder to manslaughter.32 PSCs often
work outside the countries in which they are domiciled, deploying armed
personnel to conflict zones throughout the world.33 For example, the PSC
Aegis is registered in the U.K., but has contractors deployed in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Yemen, and East Africa.34 The nature of Aegis’ work often
requires it to operate in fragile states or states emerging from armed con-
flict, where the rule of law may be weak or non-existent.35 This can result
in an absence of serious scrutiny within the states in which they operate.
In fact, contractors can be made immune from the legal process of the
state where they are deployed in a similar way to foreign military forces
under specifically negotiated Status of Forces Agreements (“SOFAs”).36
Functions and Human Rights: Comments on the UN Working Group’s Draft
Convention, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 133, 135 (2011).
29 Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 512-18 (2005).
30 The PSC CACI was contracted by the U.S. to interrogate detainees at Abu
Ghraib and four civilians alleged that CACI’s civilian interrogators ordered U.S.
military police to subject them to a wide variety of torture techniques. Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 517 (4th Cir. 2014) (allowing the case to
proceed against the PSC employees).
31 Jonathan Finer, Recent Developlment, Holstering the Hired Guns: New
Accountability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 253, 259
(2008).
32 Nicky Woolf, Former Blackwater guards sentenced for massacre of unarmed
Iraqi civilians, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/apr/13/former-blackwater-guards-sentencing-baghdad-massacre.
33 BENEDEK ET AL., supra note 28. R
34 Aegis World, Case Studies, (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.aegisworld.com/who-we-
are/case-studies/.
35 PETER SINGER, GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRACTICE CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES (DCAF), THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY AND IRAQ: WHAT
HAVE WE LEARNED AND WHERE TO NEXT?, 12-13 (2004), http://www.dcaf.ch/
Publications/The-Private-Military-Industry-and-Iraq; Elke Krahmann & Aida
Abzhaparova, The Regulation of Private Military and Security Services in the
European Union: Current Policies and Future Options 2 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Acad. Eur.
Law, Working Paper No. 2010/8, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/
18295/AEL_2010_8.pdf?sequence=1.
36 Krahmann & Abzhaparova, supra note 35, at 1. Although the U.S. has R
permitted a SOFA that allows PSC contractors to be tried in Iraqi courts, cf. Robert
Nichols, New U.S.-Iraq SOFA Lifts Contractor Immunity, 5 INT. GOV. CONTRACTOR
¶ 103 (2008).
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The legislation of many states also lacks extraterritorial reach, thereby
making it difficult to hold PSCs accountable for human rights abuses per-
petrated outside the states in which they are domiciled.37 The combina-
tion of these two factors—the limited capacity of the state where the PSC
is operating to scrutinize their activities, and the absence of extraterrito-
rial reach of legislation from the states in which the PSCs are domiciled—
generates a bubble of impunity for PSCs. This article examines whether
non-judicial remedies can successfully pierce that bubble of impunity and
provide effective remedies, as understood under IHRL. Part II identifies
the characteristics of effective remedies under human rights law. Part III
examines whether a non-judicial mechanism at the international level, the
International Code of Conduct Association for Private Security Providers
(“ICoCA”), provides an effective remedy to victims. Part IV examines a
non-judicial mechanism at the national level, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development’s (“OECD”) National Contact
Point system, to evaluate whether it provides an effective remedy to vic-
tims. Part V concludes that non-judicial remedies have not yet lived up to
their potential to offer accessible, quick and cost-effective remedies.
II. EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
It is imperative to establish what we understand to be an effective rem-
edy and what determines effectiveness. The commentary to the U.N.
Guiding Principles states that:
[A]ccess to effective remedy has both procedural and substantive
aspects. The remedies provided by the grievance mechanisms . . .
may take a range of substantive forms the aim of which, generally
speaking, will be to counteract or make good any human rights
harms that have occurred. Remedy may include apologies, restitu-
tion, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and
punitive sanctions (whether criminal or administrative, such as
fines), as well as the prevention of harm through, for example,
injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition. Procedures for the pro-
vision of remedy should be impartial, protected from corruption and
free from political or other attempts to influence the outcome.38
The following sections set out the characteristics of an effective reme-
dial mechanism by analyzing IHRL standards and the standards set out in
the U.N. Guiding Principles. I will then assess whether the selected non-
judicial mechanisms conform to these standards. The primary source of
inspiration in defining effectiveness will be IHRL. IHRL is a logical start-
ing point because the U.N. Guiding Principles state that the designers of
37 Nicola Ja¨gers, Regulating the Private Security Industry: Connecting the Public
and the Private through Transnational Private Regulation, 6 HUM. RTS. & INT’L
LEGAL DISCOURSE 56, 68 (2012).
38 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex § III.B.27. R
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non-judicial remedies should “[ensure] that outcomes and remedies
accord with internationally recognized human rights.”39 However, as
human rights law is generally designed to apply to states and judicial sys-
tems, it will have to be adapted to the specific contexts of non-judicial
remedies and businesses.
The right to an effective remedy is widely recognized under IHRL.40
Article 13 of the ECHR stipulates that “everyone whose rights and free-
doms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”41 The simplic-
ity of this statement belies a complex, multi-dimensional right comprising
a range of related express and implied rights. Thus, for example, the right
to an effective remedy is closely associated with the right of access to a
court,42 the right to test the legality of one’s detention,43 the right to just
satisfaction,44 and the right to effective judicial protection.45 The primary
guarantor of these rights is the state.46 The U.N. Guiding Principles make
it clear that states must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial,
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, that when such
abuses occur within their territory or jurisdiction, those affected have
access to an effective remedy.47
Generally speaking, the form that the remedy takes is not important48
as long as it allows the competent authorities to deal with the substance
of a complaint and grant appropriate relief.49 The U.N. Guiding Princi-
ples, for example, state that the remedy must include “investigation, pun-
ishment and redress.”50 Additionally, the remedy must be effective in
39 Id. at 26.
40 See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights supra note 9, at art. 8; R
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 3, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 14,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
41 See ICCPR, supra note 40, at art. 2. R
42 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, at art. 6(1). R
43 Id. at art. 5(4).
44 Id. at art. 41.
45 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, 2010 OJ (C 83/
02); American Convention on Human Rights art. 25, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
46 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7. R
47 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex § II.B.22. R
48 Id.; Scordino v. Italy (No. 1), App. No. 36813/97, 2006-V Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 200
(2006).
49 MSS v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R,, ¶ 288
(2011).
50 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex § I.A.1. R
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theory and in practice51 and must offer a genuine prospect of success.52 If
it is too speculative, it may not be considered effective.53 In cases where
an individual remedy is insufficient, the cumulative effect of a number of
remedies may satisfy the effectiveness criterion.54 The following sections
lay out the key components of effective remedies.
A. Investigation and Fact-Finding
The U.N. Guiding Principles specify that investigation is a general
requirement of remedies regardless of the nature of the violation.55 The
main IHRL standards on investigation developed as procedural obliga-
tions to substantive rights, such as the right to life.56 Once a potential
human rights abuse is brought to the attention of the relevant authority,
the authority should actively investigate the issue.57 This investigation
must be capable of establishing the facts and identifying and punishing
those responsible for the violation of human rights.58 Investigation is also
linked to the “right to the truth,” a right for the victims of human rights
violations and the public at large to know about the abuses committed by
the state or third parties.59
Independence is central to effective investigations. The U.N. Guiding
Principles speak of “legitimacy” as a necessary criterion for effective non-
judicial remedies, meaning “having a clear, transparent and sufficiently
independent governance structure to ensure that no party to a particular
grievance process can interfere with the fair conduct of that process.”60
51 Ilhan v. Turkey, App. No. 22277/93, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 354, ¶ 97 (2002);
Karamitrov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 53321/99, 2008 Eur Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2008).
52 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87, A247-C Eur. Ct. H.R.,
¶ 26 (1993).
53 McFarlane v. Ireland, App. No. 31333/06, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 117 (2011).
54 De Souza Ribeiro v. France, App. No. 22689/07, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 79 (2012).
55 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex § III.A.25. R
56 McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H. R. Rep. 97 (1996).
57 Ergi v. Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, 1998-IV 32 Eur. H. R. Rep 18, ¶ 82 (2001).
The U.N. Guiding Principles stipulate that where a business enterprise identifies that
they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts on human rights, they should
provide for or cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes. U.N.
Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex §§ II.B.20-II.B.21. G.A. Res. 55/89, Annex R
(Dec. 4, 2000).
58 Keenan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27229/95, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 123;
Ogur v. Turkey, App. No. 21594/93, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 912, ¶ 88; G.A. Res. 55/89,
supra note 57, at Annex ¶ 1(a). R
59 El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 191 (2012). See
also Federico Fabbrini, The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary
Renditions and the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human
Rights Violations Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 85,
85 (2013).
60 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex § I.A.1. R
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There should be hierarchical, operational, and practical independence in
investigations. Hierarchical independence requires that the chain of com-
mand controlling the investigators be independent from that of the
accused parties.61 In Jordan v. United Kingdom, for example, a violation
of the procedural obligations of the right to life was found, in part,
because there was a hierarchical link between the police officers running
the investigation and the officers subject to investigation.62 All officers
were ultimately responsible to the same leader and there was insufficient
independence to achieve an effective investigation. In Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, the ECtHR stated that operational independence required the
military police investigating the incidents to be institutionally separate
from the soldiers they were investigating.63 Finally, practical indepen-
dence demands that investigators have access to their own resources and
be self-reliant.64 While these conditions arose in the context of violations
of the right to life, similar standards of independence should apply to
non-judicial actors investigating PSCs who violate human rights.
By contrast, the U.N. Guiding Principles do not specify independence
as an explicit criterion for non-judicial grievance mechanisms. Instead,
the U.N. Guiding Principles demand that non-judicial remedies enable
trust from the stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended.65 If
grievance mechanisms are not sufficiently independent and impartial,
they are unlikely to engender trust among their users. When evaluating
independence and impartiality, we should consider how members of the
non-judicial body are appointed, their terms of office, and whether they
are safeguarded from outside pressures.66 The remedial mechanism
should also be impartial from an objective and subjective perspective.
Subjectively, no member of the tribunal should hold any personal
prejudice or bias toward the applicant, while objectively the remedial
mechanism should offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate
doubt in this respect.67 There should not be any ascertainable fact that
may raise doubts as to the impartiality of the investigators or decision-
makers, and even appearances that raise doubts may be of certain impor-
61 Case C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de
Luxembourg, 2006 E.C.R. I-08613, ¶ 52; G.A. Res. 55/89, supra note 57, at Annex ¶ 2. R
62 Jordan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24746/94, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 120 (2001).
63 Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 2011 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1093, ¶ 167 (2011).
64 Alastair Mowbray, Shorter Articles, Comments and Notes, Duties of
Investigation under the European Convention on Human Rights, 51 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 437, 440 (2002); G.A. Res. 55/89, supra note 57, at Annex ¶ 3(a). R
65 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at Annex 26. R
66 Moiseyev v. Russia, App. No. 62936/00, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 173 (2008); G.A.
Res. 55/89, supra note 57, at Annex ¶ 5(a). R
67 Micallef v. Malta, App. No. 17056/06, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 93 (2009).
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tance.68 These criteria are closely associated with judicial remedies, but in
order for non-judicial remedies to engender trust and be ‘rights compati-
ble’ in a more general sense, non-judicial investigations and remedial
mechanisms should accord with these standards.
B. Accessibility
The U.N. Guiding Principles specify that an important factor in deter-
mining the effectiveness of a remedy is accessibility.69 Accessibility
requires that a remedy is known to all stakeholder groups, for whose use
the remedy is intended, and that the remedy provides adequate assistance
for those who may face particular barriers to access.70 These barriers
could include lack of awareness of the remedy, language, and cost. In the
context of IHRL, many of the rulings on accessibility are made in the
context of fair trial rights and the right of access to a court. However,
there are a number of parallels that can be drawn to non-judicial griev-
ance mechanisms.
As a general principle, concerning the idea that stakeholders should be
aware of the remedy, human rights law requires the remedy to be availa-
ble in theory and practice.71 If a remedy is too speculative or not well
known, it will impinge on its effectiveness.72 Every party to a complaint
should have a reasonable opportunity to present their case under condi-
tions that do not place them at a substantial disadvantage vis-a`-vis their
opponent.73 Thus, when the cost of seeking a remedy may create a sub-
stantial barrier to access, human rights law may require the provision of
legal aid to applicants for a particular remedy.74 This is especially perti-
nent where there is a significant disparity in the levels of legal assistance
available to each party, as may often be the case in a complaint between a
PSC and private individuals. An interesting example is Steel and Morris v.
United Kingdom, where McDonalds successfully sued environmental
campaigners for defamation and was awarded thousands of British
pounds in damages.75 The campaigners, who had been denied legal aid
for their case by the U.K. government, successfully sued the U.K. for fail-
ing to provide them with legal assistance.76 The ECtHR held that the
68 Id. at ¶ 96; Bryan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19178/91, A335-A Eur. Ct.
H.R., ¶ 38 (1995).
69 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
70 Id.
71 Kudla v. Poland, App. No. 30210/96, 2000-XI Eur Ct. H.R. 512, ¶ 157 (2000).
72 McFarlane supra note 53, at ¶ 117. R
73 De Haes v. Belgium, App. No. 19983/92, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, ¶ 53 (1997).
74 Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, ¶ 24-25 (1979).
75 See generally Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 68416/01, 2005-II
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
76 Id. at ¶ 32-33.
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disparity between the levels of legal assistance available to each party
could not have failed to give rise to unfairness.77
Language may also generate a barrier to access for applicants. In the
context of criminal trials, IHRL demands that the state provide transla-
tions of relevant court documents, such as indictments,78 and translations
of court proceedings.79 Ultimately, victims should have access to the
advice and expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair
and equitable terms.80
C. Speed
IHRL requires that remedies be delivered within a reasonable time.81
Under the ECHR, for example, there is a positive obligation on con-
tracting states to organize their legal systems in such a way as to ensure
that legal proceedings are conducted in an efficient and speedy manner,82
while Article 6(1) guarantees the right to have a case heard in a reasona-
ble time.83 The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for Democracy
through Law notes that the speed of a remedial action itself is a factor in
assessing its effectiveness.84 Remedies that can take a long time to con-
clude will not be considered effective.85 Even when a remedy is generally
considered effective, this effectiveness could be undermined by its exces-
sive duration.86
Generally speaking, there is no fixed amount of time a grievance
should take to resolve. The U.N. Guiding Principles mention that non-
judicial remedies should provide an indicative time frame for each stage
and that the outcomes and remedies need to “accord with internationally
77 Id. at ¶ 69.
78 Kamasinski v. Austria, App. No. 9783/82, A168 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, ¶ 79 (1989).
79 Cuscani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32771/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (2002).
80 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
81 EUR. COMM. FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, CAN EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF
PROCEEDINGS BE REMEDIED?, 16-17 (2007) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION
FOR DEMOCRACY].
82 Su¨ssman v. Germany, App. No. 20024/92, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 55.
83 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, at art. 6(1). R
84 European Commission for Democracy, supra note 81. R
85 Id. at ¶ 161; See also Vaney v. France, App. No. 53946/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 53
(2004); Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, A246-B Eur.
Ct. H.R. 379, (2004).
86 McFarlane, supra note 53, at ¶ 123. Of course duration and delay are also R
significant issues for judicial remedies for human rights. At the international level, the
ECtHR has approximately 65 thousand applications pending. See ECTHR, ANALYSIS
OF STATISTICS 2015 4 (2016). At the national level, the judicial systems of a number
of states have significant issues with delay. Italy is perhaps the most notorious
example where a specific human rights remedy aimed at compensating people for
delay itself was found to be taking too long in providing compensation. See, e.g.,
Daddi v. Italy, App. No. 15476/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., 6-8 (2009).
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recognized human rights,” which would include the speed requirement.87
However, we must recognize that the speed of the remedy is a relative
concept and the conduct of the parties is a significant factor. When the
ECtHR, for example, is considering whether a particular case has taken
too long, it looks at “the circumstances of the case and having regard to
the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law, in particular the complexity
of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities,
and the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the litiga-
tion.”88 Thus, while speed is a factor in determining effectiveness, it is a
relative factor that should be subject to careful individual assessment.
D. Transparency
The criterion of transparency encompasses a number of different obli-
gations, which touch on other criteria. First, remedial mechanisms must
have transparent processes and outcomes.89 They should be predictable
and clear, a condition linked to accessibility in that the remedy must be
clear and certain in theory and practice for it to be considered effective.90
In general, states have an obligation to inform the general public and
victims of human rights abuses of the remedies available to them.91
Second, transparency entails an element of information disclosure. The
U.N. Guiding Principles stipulate that grievance mechanisms should pro-
vide sufficient information about the mechanism’s performance to build
confidence in its effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake.92 We
noted above that there is a broader “right to the truth” about serious
violations of IHRL, which is linked to the right to an effective remedy.93
The “right to truth” has an element of transparency, enabling a victim of
a human rights violation to learn the truth about what happened by seek-
ing and obtaining information on the causes and conditions pertaining to
the violation.94 These two elements of information disclosure and public
interest are closely related. National legal systems also have detailed rules
on the disclosure of evidence between parties to a case, as having access
to this information is extremely important for litigants to defend or prose-
cute their respective cases.95
87 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26-27. R
88 Comingersoll v. Portugal, App. No. 35382/97, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 19
89 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
90 Mifsud v. France, App. No. 57220/00, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 19 (2002); Da
Silva v. Luxembourg, App. No. 30273/07, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 40 (2010).
91 G.A. Res. 60/147, ¶ 24 (Dec. 16, 2005).
92 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26-27. R
93 See generally Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the right to the truth,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006).
94 Id. at 9.
95 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26; CPR 31.6. (Eng. and Wales).
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Third, there should be a degree of public scrutiny of the remedy and
how it functions, although this will vary from case to case.96 Under IHRL,
there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of investigations and
their results to secure accountability and public confidence in the authori-
ties.97 While there is a presumption that state authorities are accountable
to the public, a lower level of public accountability arguably applies to
private companies where they carry out remedial functions or investiga-
tions related to human rights violations. The victims or their next of kin
must be involved in the remedial action to the extent necessary to safe-
guard their legitimate interests.98 While there is no requirement that the
victim have access to an investigation while it is ongoing, access to the
investigation or documents should occur at other stages, such as after
completion, and complainants should be kept informed about the pro-
gress of the complaint.99 Finally, the U.N. Guiding Principles specify that
openness and transparency should be the default position, and trans-
parency should be presumed wherever possible.100
E. Redress
It is important that grievance mechanisms advise complainants, at the
outset, about the redress the mechanism may provide complainants for
human rights violations, a concept closely related to the issue of trans-
parency.101 Yet, there is a great deal of flexibility in terms of the potential
redress a grievance mechanism can offer. Restitution is the preferred
remedy,102 but the state has discretion when this is not possible, provided
that the remedy ultimately chosen is compatible with the court’s conclu-
sions.103 Other options for redress can include apologies, restitution, com-
pensation, and guarantees of non-repetition.104 It may be necessary for
the grievance procedure to offer some kind of interim relief or suspension
of adverse activities while a complaint is investigated.105
Dialogue between the parties aimed at settling the dispute prior to
adjudication is encouraged, an example of which at the IHRL-level
96 Ramsahai v. Netherlands, App. No. 52391/99, 2007-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 55 (2007);
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
97 Ramsahai, supra note 96; Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97, 2002-IV R
Eur. Ct. H.R., at 28.
98 Anguelova supra note 97, at 28. R
99 McKerr v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28883/95, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R., at 40-41.
100 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
101 PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
83 (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 2011).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Selc¸uk and Asker v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23184/94 and 23185/94, 1998-II Eur. Ct.
H.R., at 28; U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 22; Kudla, supra note 71, at 34- R
35.
105 ECtHR, Rules of Court, R. 39 (June 1, 2010) [hereinafter Rules of Court].
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occurs through friendly settlements at the ECtHR.106 Another example
of dialogue aimed at settling disputes prior to adjudication occurs at the
national level, where grievance mechanisms like the National Contact
Points for the OECD offer good offices to complainants in an attempt to
resolve the dispute.107
When compensation is offered, it must be adequate, and where a low
level of compensation is offered, it may be considered so derisory that it
impacts the effectiveness of the remedy at issue.108 Equally, compensa-
tion should be paid in a timely manner, as delays can impact effective-
ness.109 Redress may also involve the adoption of general or specific
measures to put an end to a violation or prevent its re-occurrence.110
These remedial measures may need to address structural deficiencies or
systemic problems, which have given rise to particular human rights
abuses, in order to be effective.111 Finally, the U.N. Guiding Principles
stipulate that there should be a means of monitoring the implementation
of any outcome of a remedial mechanism.112
Thus, overall effective remedial mechanisms require a swift and thor-
ough investigation of the facts of the complaint by independent parties.
The remedy must be accessible in theory and in practice by the complain-
ant and the mechanism must address the complaint in a timely manner.
The procedures of the remedy should be clear and all the necessary infor-
mation, including outcomes, should be disclosed. Finally, the mechanism
must offer redress for the complainant where a company is deemed to be
at fault.
III. INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL MECHANISMS
PSCs have grown into transnational corporations that operate in one
country, recruit employees outside that jurisdiction, and deploy personnel
throughout the world.113 As a result, regulation by individual states is
unlikely to be sufficient to properly control their activities.114 In fact,
106 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, at art 39. R
107 UK NATIONAL CONTACT POINT PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH
COMPLAINTS BROUGHT UNDER THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 14 (2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/270577/bis-14-518-procedural-guidance.pdf.
108 Keenan, supra note 58, at 39. R
109 O¨neryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R., at 50 (2004).
110 Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, App. Nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, 2000-VIII Eur.
Ct. H.R., at 50 (2000).
111 Rules of Court, supra note 105, at R. 61; Olaru v. Moldova, App. Nos. 476/07, R
22539/05, 17911/08 and 13136/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Broniowski v. Poland, App.
No. 31443/96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2004).
112 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26-27. R
113 Gabor Rona, A Tour de Horizon of Issues on the Agenda of the Mercenaries
Working Group, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 324, 344 (2013).
114 Id.
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adopting tougher regulations in the state where the PSC is domiciled may
trigger a counter-productive “race to the bottom” with PSCs moving to
the states with the least stringent domestic regulations.115 Thus, it makes
sense to regulate PSCs at the international level.116 Such international
regulation would reduce the capacity of PSCs to capitalize on the current
disparities between different regulatory regimes in different states.
Yet, even if one accepts the logic behind international regulation, the
process of regulating at the international level can be protracted, com-
plex, and riven with political issues. The U.N. Working Group on the Use
of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination developed a draft
International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring
of Private Military and Security Companies covering this subject.117 How-
ever, because states with large private security industries, like the U.S.
and the U.K., opposed the Convention, it will have to overcome signifi-
cant opposition before it becomes law.118
Ja¨gers argues that “conventional international law-making is as yet
unable to deliver a substantive answer to the challenges posed [by the
regulation of PSCs].”119 The Draft Convention, for example, envisages
that remedies for violations of its terms will be grounded in the national
systems of contracting states.120 This means that the remedy is only as
strong as the national system and, as White points out, many national
legal systems are weak.121 States already have obligations to protect peo-
ple within their jurisdiction from human rights violations caused by third
115 Erica L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security
Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49
HARV. INT’L L. J. 221, 241 (2008); EUR. COMM. FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW
(VENICE COMM.), Report on Private Military and Security Firms and Erosion of the
State Monopoly on the Use of Force, 79th Plenary sess., Doc. No.  CDL-AD(2009)038
(2009).
116 Eugenio Cusumano, Policy Prospects for Regulating Private Military and
Security Companies, in WAR BY CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW,
AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS 26 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti eds.,
2011).
117 Jose´ Luis Go´mez del Prado (Chairperson/Rapporteur, U.N. Human Rights
Council), Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/25, annex (2010) [hereinafter Mercenaries].
118 Laurence Juma, Privatisation, Human Rights and Security: Reflections on the
Draft International Convention on Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private
Military and Security Companies, 15 L. DEMOCRACY & DEV. 182, 183-85 (2011);
White, supra note 28, at 150. R
119 Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 88. R
120 Mercenaries, supra note 117, at 36. R
121 White, supra note 28, at 149. R
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parties,122 including PSCs. However, as noted above, the national judicial
systems of states are, by and large, failing to provide effective remedies
for human rights abuses perpetrated by PSCs. There is also a palpable
absence of international political will to introduce binding International
Law aimed at regulating the actions of PSCs,123 and indeed business more
generally.124 Shah argues that there is insufficient international consensus
to take forward a comprehensive treaty on PSC regulation, pointing to
the Montreux Process as a clear example of the lack of consensus.125 This
process aimed to define how International Law applies to the activities of
private security companies when they are operating in an armed conflict
zone and resulted in the non-binding Montreux Document.126 At first,
the Montreux Document was signed by only seventeen states, though it
has since been signed by a total of fifty-four.127 The impetus to develop
voluntary, non-judicial international mechanisms in this field results in
part from the weakness of the public law response to the regulation of
PSCs,128 the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights129 and
the Sarajevo Code of Conduct for PSCs are just two examples of this
trend.130 These codes of conduct have incorporated human rights stan-
dards to varying degrees.131 However, the International Code of Conduct
for Private Security Providers (“ICoC”), discussed in the next sections,
represents a new type of voluntary agreement, incorporating a collabora-
122 Ergi supra note 57, at 26; Kolevi v Bulgaria, App. No. 1108/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 32 R
(2009); Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 55523/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., 17 (2007).
123 See Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 88 (showing the Draft Convention has R
encountered strong resistance from states, particularly the U.K. and U.S., which have
large PSC industries).
124 A recent U.N. Human Rights Council resolution on the elaboration of an
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights sharply divided the council. While
the resolution passed, there were 20 votes for 14 against and 13 abstentions. Human
Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, at 2 (June 25, 2014).
125 Reema Shah, Comment, Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to
Enforce the International Code of Conduct for Private Military Companies, 123 YALE
L. J. 2559, 2564 (2014).
126 Id.
127 Participating States of the Montreux Document, MONTREUX DOCUMENT
FORUM, (Nov. 5, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.mdforum.ch/en/participants.
128 Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 91. R
129 What are the Voluntary Principles? VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 19, 2016) http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-
voluntary-principles/.
130 The Sarajevo Code of Conduct for PSCs 2006, SEESAC (Feb. 19, 2016) http://
www.seesac.org/res/files/publication/544.pdf.
131 Carsten Hoppe & Ottavio Quirico, Codes of Conduct for Private Military and
Security Companies: The State of Self-regulation in the Industry, in WAR BY
CONTRACT: HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
362, 368 (Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti, eds., 2011).
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tion of states, civil society organizations (“CSOs”), and members of the
PSC industry to synthesize existing industry standards into its regulatory
framework.
A. The ICoC
The ICoC is a spinoff from the Montreux process. While the Montreux
process was directed toward the states’ obligations, the ICoC was
directed toward the companies’ obligations.132 Because the ICoC itself
and its Association, the ICoCA, are still new, their procedures and work-
ing modalities are still germinating. The ICoC establishes a multifaceted
compliance regime, which includes certification of companies, internal
and potentially external grievance mechanisms, rules on procurement,
periodic reporting within the companies themselves and in the field, and
obligations of cooperation with different authorities.133
The ICoCA oversees the ICoC and is comprised of a Board of Direc-
tors, a General Assembly (“GA”) and a Secretariat.134 The GA serves as
a forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue, votes on ICoC matters, and
appoints the Board of Directors.135 The Board of Directors includes an
even distribution of representatives from civil society, states, and the
industry.136 In addition, it serves as the executive body of the ICoCA by
overseeing the Secretariat, reporting on the implementation of the ICoC,
making recommendations to the GA, and developing the ICoCA’s oper-
ating procedures.137 The Secretariat’s key role is to gather information for
compliance reports on the companies, receive complaints from third par-
ties about the activities of PSCs, and engage in dialogue with PSCs.138
This open dialogue offers observations aimed at improving performance
or addressing specific compliance concerns.
A key element of the ICoC involves certification, which is defined as:
[a] process through which the governance and oversight mechanism
[ICoCA], will certify that a Company’s systems and policies meet the
Code’s principles and the standards derived from the Code and that
132 CORINNA SEIBERTH, PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CHALLENGE FOR NON-BINDING NORMS: THEN MONTREUX
DOCUMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY
SERVICE PROVIDERS, 164 (2014).
133 See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE
SECURITY PROVIDERS (2010) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT].
134 The ICoC Association: About, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
ASSOCIATION (last visited Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.icoca.ch/en/icoc-association.
135 Articles of Association, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, art.
6 (September 20, 2013) http://www.icoca.ch/en/articles_of_association#article-15-
formation-and-dissolution [hereinafter ICoCA Articles of Association].
136 See The ICoC Association: About, supra note 134. R
137 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at arts. 7-8. R
138 Id. at arts. 12-13.
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a Company is undergoing Monitoring, Auditing, and verification,
including in the field, by the governance and oversight mechanism.139
The aim here is to harmonize the ICoC with existing standards, such as
the American National Standards Institute’s PSC 1,140 and emerging
national and international standards for the private security industry.141
The certification committee assesses submissions from members of any
relevant standard related to security operations as a potential pathway to
ICoCA certification.142 This committee evaluates the content of the stan-
dard and the process by which a company is, or would be, certified to
it.143 Once this assessment is complete, the committee drafts a recognition
statement for it, which includes its assessment of the standard.144 Mem-
bers can then comment on this and the ICoCA Board of Directors ulti-
mately vote on whether or not to accept the proposed standard.145 As of
November 2016, the committee has only accepted the PSC 1 standard and
ISO 28007 as compatible with the ICoCA.146
Given that the ICoCA is so new and its procedures and processes are
still developing, it is difficult to assess the ICoCA’s long-term effective-
ness as a remedial mechanism at this point in time. However, we can
evaluate the mechanism as it currently stands, evaluate the standards
accepted by the ICoCA, and assess their future prospects. At first glance,
the ICoC and ICoCA appear to be a promising prospect for regulating
PSCs. The ICoC’s objective of establishing external and independent
mechanisms for effective governance and oversight of PSCs is sorely
needed in the industry.147 Whereas other instruments, like the Montreux
Document, focused solely on PSC activities during armed conflict,148 the
ICoC covers a much broader category of PSC action. It addresses the
139 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133. R
140 The PSC 1 standard requires PSCs to introduce a quality assurance
management system, which assists companies working in circumstances of weakened
governance where the rule of law has been undermined due to human or naturally
caused events. This standard provides auditable criteria and guidance for PSCs, which
is consistent with the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers
(ICoC). See generally AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, INC.,
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR QUALITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY OPERATIONS -
REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE (2012).
141 Laura A. Dickinson, Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: The Promise
of Public/Private Governance, 63 EMORY L. J. 417, 426-27 (2013).
142 Draft ICoCA Certification Principles and Procedure, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF




146 Certification, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION (Nov. 4, 2016)
https://icoca.ch/en/certification.
147 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133, at 4. R
148 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 164. R
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actions of signatory companies while performing security services in
“complex environments,” which encompass “any areas experiencing or
recovering from unrest or instability.”149 This means that it applies to the
actions of PSCs in both pre- and post-conflict contexts.
Many have commented on the need to engage a wide network of stake-
holders in the process of regulating PSCs.150 The fact that the ICoCA is a
multi-stakeholder affair comprised of states, PSCs, and CSOs is a wel-
come development.151 The Board of Directors, for example, is comprised
of twelve members, with four representatives from each stakeholder
group.152 CSOs, in particular, can play a valuable role in regulating PSCs
through transnational networks, exerting pressure on PSCs’ home states,
and financing litigation.153
The ICoC has been praised for its detailed articulation of a wide range
of norms and procedures to which PSCs should adhere.154 However,
while the ICoC offers detailed rules on issues such as the use of force and
detention, the absence of any economic, social, or cultural rights is con-
cerning given the capacity of PSCs to impact upon these rights.155 Despite
largely following the approach of the U.N. Guiding Principles, not all of
the due diligence obligations of corporations identified in Ruggie’s
Framework are covered in the ICoC; for example, there is little on PSCs
undertaking a proper assessment of their likely human rights impacts.156
In the following sections, we will scrutinize the ICoC and ICoCA to
determine whether they conform to IHRL standards on effective
remedies.
i. Investigation and Fact-finding
The Secretariat of the ICoC may receive complaints from third parties
about the activities of the PSCs that signed up to the ICoC.157 The ICoC
also contains provisions aimed at ongoing compliance monitoring, which
is described as a “process for gathering data on whether Company Per-
sonnel, or subcontractors, are operating in compliance with the ICoC’s
principles and standards derived from this Code.”158 The mechanism is
149 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133, at 5. R
150 Daphne Richemond-Barak, Can Self-Regulation Work: Lessons from the
Private Security and Military Industry, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 773, 784 (2014);
Cusumano, supra note 116, at, 11. R
151 Richemond-Barak, supra note 150, at 774. R
152 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art. 7.2. R
153 Cusumano, supra note 116, at 27. R
154 Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 74. R
155 Nigel D. White, Due Diligence Obligations of Conduct: Developing a
Responsibility Regime for PMSCs, 31 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 233, 249-50 (2012).
156 Id. at 250.
157 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at arts 12 & 13. R
158 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133, at 5. R
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clearly capable of identifying the facts of an alleged human rights abuse,
but it is unclear how deep investigations can or will go in practice and the
degree of cooperation from companies that will be required for any inves-
tigations to be successful. While companies are certified to the PSC 1
standard in order to comply with the ICoC, the certification procedure
includes assessment by an external auditor, who can also receive com-
plaints about the company’s behavior and investigate them.
The ICoCA has fleshed out the monitoring procedures of the ICoC.159
Under these procedures the ICoCA will develop and issue “performance
and compliance indicators” to its members.160 The Secretariat of the
ICoCA will search for, receive and review information from the public
and other available sources on whether the members are complying with
the ICoC.161 The Secretariat reviews the information, identifies compli-
ance concerns against the performance and compliance indicators,
assesses the human rights impacts of the company’s operations, and iden-
tifies and analyzes broader patterns.162 There are legitimate concerns
about how thorough this process will be, given that there are over one
hundred PSCs signed up to the ICoC and the Secretariat consists only of
a team of six people.163 To offset this, companies themselves will provide
a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a set of criteria
covered by “necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure arrange-
ments.”164 The format and structure of information sought through the
reports will align with the performance and compliance indicators.165 The
Articles of Association for the ICoCA are not very clear about the perio-
dicity of the reports and the level of detail required in particular whether
specific proof is required of how each criterion of the ICoC is satisfied.166
Additionally, the ICoC makes provision for some on-site monitoring of
PSCs in other states, although this is limited to situations where risk
assessments have identified the need for further monitoring or in
response to a specific request from a member of the ICoCA.167 Accord-
ingly, the Secretariat will conduct a more active investigation once spe-
cific human rights concerns are identified.
159 Procedures Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance and
Compliance, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, (Nov. 4, 2016),
https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCAt-Procedures-Article-12-Monitor
ing.pdf [hereinafter PROCEDURES ARTICLE 12].
160 Id. at I. B.
161 Id. at II.A. ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art. 12.2.1. R
162 Id. at art. 12.2.4.
163 The Secretariat, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, (Nov. 4,
2016), http://www.icoca.ch/en/secretariat.
164 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art. 12.2.2. R
165 PROCEDURES ARTICLE 12, supra note 159, at III. A. R
166 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 197. R
167 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art. 12.2.3; SEIBERTH, supra R
note 132, at 199. R
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The possibility of carrying out on-site monitoring represents a positive
development in the ICoC, as it could offer a means of assessing whether
the company’s commitment to the Code is actually being operationalized.
While it can be expensive, on-site monitoring offers a beneficial avenue
for assessing compliance. It is lamentable that this process appears to
have been watered down significantly, and instead of all companies being
subject to inspections, few companies will be subjected to on-site moni-
toring in limited circumstances.168 There are no specific conditions that
automatically trigger on-site monitoring, which is left to the Executive
Director’s discretion.169 The ICoCA must also seek the consent of the
company before engaging in on-site monitoring with no express sanctions
for refusing consent.170
As far as the independence and impartiality of the ICoCA is con-
cerned, the Secretariat is composed of IHRL and corporate social respon-
sibility experts, not industry figures.171 The ICoCA is separated from the
people it is investigating and has its own allocated budget. While individ-
uals from the PSC industry sitting on a Board of Directors oversee the
Secretariat, the Board is balanced between states, PSCs, and CSOs, which
reduces concerns over impartiality and independence.172 However, there
are a few issues that need to be addressed. There is a clear and significant
disparity in the membership of the Association. There is a lack of geo-
graphical diversity among the Association’s members,173 as over 60% of
the PSCs involved are either based in the U.S. or Europe.174 Further-
more, the membership of the Association currently consists of six states,
eighteen CSOs, and one hundred and one PSCs.175 The dominance of
PSCs could affect the ICoCA’s independence. Since all members get to
vote in the election of directors, and the industry significantly outnum-
bers the other factions, they can exert a substantial amount of
influence.176
168 Id.
169 PROCEDURES ARTICLE 12, supra note 159, at VI. B. R
170 Id. VI. D.
171 The Secretariat, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, (Aug. 17,
2015), http://www.icoca.ch/en/secretariat.
172 Richemond-Barak, supra note 150, at 774. R
173 Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 80. R
174 This statistic is based on analysis of the 101 PSC members of the association as
of 5 November 2016, 63 of which were based in Europe or the U.S. Membership,
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www
.icoca.ch/en/membership.
175 Accurate on November 4, 2016.
176 Shah, supra note 125, at 2567; White, supra note 155, at 251. R
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ii. Accessibility
There are some concerns over the accessibility of the ICoCA’s reme-
dial mechanism. First, while the ICOC has been translated into a number
of languages, the information on certification and monitoring is only
available in English or French, making these documents less accessible.177
The Secretariat is in the process of creating a public form for the submis-
sion of complaints, which will be in English and “any additional lan-
guages the Board may determine are appropriate,”178 which may also
impact on accessibility. The overall approach of the ICoCA’s remedy
lacks predictability and transparency and may be difficult for complain-
ants to grasp. Individual complaints could take a number of different
paths. In the first place, the ICoCA’s complaints procedure has a residual
character and the ICoCA will typically recommend using the company’s
grievance mechanism. The ICoC imposes an obligation on businesses to
create company-based grievance mechanisms that are “fair, accessible
and offer effective remedies, including recommendations for the preven-
tion of recurrence.”179 If a complainant alleges that a company’s griev-
ance mechanism is not fair, not accessible, does not or cannot offer an
effective remedy, or otherwise does not comply with the ICoC, the Secre-
tariat shall review that allegation.180 If the grievance mechanism of the
PSC is considered deficient, this will result in dialogue between the com-
pany and the Board and possible recommendations for corrective actions
or referral of the complaint to a different mechanism.181 Where the PSC’s
grievance mechanism is considered inadequate, the complainant may
elect to follow one of the following paths, utilise the good offices of the
ICoCA to try to resolve the complaint between the parties, accept refer-
ral to an external mediator or receive advice from the ICoCA on poten-
tial alternative grievance mechanisms available to the complainant.182
Thus there is a clear emphasis on first utilizing company-based mecha-
nisms and existing judicial and non-judicial machinery to address com-
177 Certification, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, http://www
.icoca.ch/en/certification (follow drop-down menu on top right of website; then select
“Functions” hyperlink, then follow the “Certification” hyperlink; then select drop-
down menu on top right of website) (demonstrating that English and French are the
only available translations for information regarding ICoC Certification); Monitoring,
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, supra note 161 (select drop-down R
menu on top right of website) (demonstrating that English and French are the only
available translations for information regarding ICoC Monitoring).
178 Procedures for Receiving and Processing Complaints under Article 13,
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATION, (Nov. 4, 2016), https://icoca.ch/
sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-Procedures-Article-13-Complaints.pdf [hereinfter
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE].
179 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133, at 15. R
180 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art.13.2.3. R
181 Id. at art. 13.2.4.
182 COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE, supra note 178, at IV D 3. R
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plaints. This is in keeping with the U.N. Guiding Principles approach, but
White argues that in the absence of some effective oversight, the reme-
dies provided by company-based grievance mechanisms will be at the
whim of businesses.183 This unpredictability and obligation first to
exhaust other avenues undermines the accessibility of the ICoC as a rem-
edy.184 Equally, the ICoC relies too much on other mechanisms, which
may not themselves offer effective remedies, while failing to offer a better
solution itself.185
Stakeholders are often at a considerable disadvantage when dealing
with a company in terms of the expertise they have available to them on
issues such as their rights, scientific data, and other relevant informa-
tion.186 In practice, companies certified to the PSC 1 standard must mini-
mize obstacles to access of their remedial structures caused by language,
educational level, or fear of reprisal.187 PSC 1 requires that the organiza-
tion protect individuals submitting a complaint or grievance in good faith
from retaliation,188 including express commitments that the organization
or persons working on its behalf may not retaliate against anyone who
files a grievance or cooperates in the investigation of a grievance.189
While the PSC 1 standard does not explicitly require companies to pro-
vide funding support for neutral third-party expertise and advice, such a
requirement could be read into the obligation to minimize obstacles
caused by educational level.
iii. Speed
On the positive side, the PSC 1 standard obliges companies to provide
indicative timeframes for investigations and outcomes,190 which is one of
U.N. Guiding Principles’ recommendations for non-judicial remedies.191
The complaints process implemented by the ICoCA must also include
indicative timeframes.192 However, the aforementioned issues with the
predictability of the ICoCA remedial mechanism also generate concerns
over the speed of the remedy. The ICoCA is reliant on the PSC to pro-
183 White, supra note 155, at 250. R
184 The same criticism can of course be levied against international judicial
remedies in the field of human rights, such as applications to the European Court of
Human Rights, which demand that applicants exhaust domestic remedies before
applying to the court. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 7, at R
art. 35(1).
185 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 211-12. R
186 Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies
and their Stakeholders, supra note 26, at 16-17. R
187 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, INC., supra note 140, at 23. R
188 Id. at 26.
189 Id. at 73.
190 Id. at 74.
191 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 26. R
192 COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE, supra note 178, at I B. R
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vide a quick and effective remedy. Where the PSC’s grievance mecha-
nism proves ineffective, the prospect of entering into dialogue with the
complainant to establish how the grievance mechanism is deficient is
unlikely to produce swift results. It may be beneficial for both the ICoC
and the companies to engage in this dialogue to improve the grievance
mechanisms, but it is difficult to see how this process will benefit the com-
plainant. There also appears to be a presumption that the grievance
mechanisms are effective and the onus rests with the complainant to
prove otherwise. The complainant may require expert advice to deter-
mine these deficiencies, which may not be apparent at the outset, mean-
ing that the complainant may waste time utilizing the mechanism, thereby
negating the speed and utility of the remedy. Ultimately, victims of
human rights violations do not want to debate the merits of a particular
grievance mechanism; they want redress for the violations they have suf-
fered. The fact that the ICoC requires applicants to pursue potentially
ineffective remedies and engage in these dialogues means that it will be
unlikely to provide a timely remedy to satisfy IHRL requirements. The
ICoCA could learn from the approach of international human rights bod-
ies, such as the ECtHR and the Human Rights Committee, where appli-
cants are not obliged to exhaust remedies if they are likely to be
ineffective.193
iv. Transparency
The PSC 1 standard requires PSCs to establish set procedures to docu-
ment grievances.194 They must also make provisions for the confidential-
ity and privacy of complainants,195 including procedures for registering
anonymous complaints and grievances.196 By having a clear process for
handling complaints, PSC 1 should satisfy some of the transparency crite-
ria discussed above. As for the ICoC itself, a number of commentators
have remarked on how transparent the process of adopting and imple-
menting the ICoC has been overall.197 However, the fact that the compa-
nies’ assessments of their performance are to be covered by
“confidentiality and nondisclosure arrangements”198 is a cause for con-
cern. This generates scope for companies to refuse to share information
with the monitoring mechanisms owing to contractual provisions or the
potential for parallel legal proceedings.199 The issue of confidentiality, a
193 See McFarlane, supra note 53; La¨nsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. R
511/1992, ¶ 6.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Nov. 8, 1994).
194 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, INC., supra, note 140, at 26. R
195 Id. at 74.
196 Id. at 67.
197 Richemond-Barak, supra note 150, at 796; Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 80-81. R
198 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art.12.2.2. R
199 Go´mez del Prado, Mercenaries, supra note 117, at 7. R
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sticking point for other codes of conduct in the past,200 and the innate
secrecy of the PSC industry could make achieving transparency in report-
ing problematic.201 The reports compiled by the PSCs on compliance with
the code remain confidential, as do any discussions between the Secreta-
riat of the ICoCA and PSCs concerning suspected non-compliance with
the ICoC.202 However, in the event of non-compliance there is scope for
the Board of Directors to issue a public statement on the outcome of a
review undertaken by the ICoCA.203 There is no express obligation on
the ICoCA to do so and this is again left to the discretion of the Board.
While the confidentiality of the reports and dialogue is supposed to
“encourage frank and honest disclosure,”204 the secrecy of the process
and the absence of independent public scrutiny generate legitimate con-
cerns regarding the transparency of the process of review.
The complaints procedure enacted by the ICoCA also has strict confi-
dentiality requirements and the procedure set out by the ICoCA stipu-
lates that “[p]arties participating in the ICoCA Complaints process will
be required to agree in writing to keep all matters pertaining to the Com-
plaints process confidential and not to disclose it outside of the proce-
dure.”205 Furthermore, allegations of the complaint, facts in dispute, and
the resolution of any complaint brought to the ICoCA will not be dis-
closed beyond the parties to the complaint. While confidentiality during
the dispute may be understandable, the ICoCA apparently wishes to
keep a tight rein on disclosure of its results. The Secretariat is to keep a
public register noting only “(1) when a complaint was brought, (2) the
name of the affected company, (3) the general nature of the alleged viola-
tion(s), and (4) the resolution of the complaint or other conclusion to the
complaints process.”206 This limits the scope for independent external
evaluation of the complaints procedure’s performance.
It is worth reiterating that the ICoCA’s own grievance procedure lacks
predictability as to its potential outcomes. It could also be argued, as
Seiberth does, that the ICoC relies on external third parties, such as bod-
ies evaluating accreditation for PSC 1, too much to properly assess and
evaluate the standards upheld by the PSCs. The ICoC’s oversight role is
thus delegated to private accreditation and certification bodies in prac-
tice, meaning it is only as strong as the processes employed by these third
parties. The process of contracting out the task to industry members
developing their own standards carries the danger of a conflict of inter-
200 Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 80-81. R
201 Id. at 72.
202 PROCEDURES ARTICLE 12, supra note 159, at III. B. R
203 Id. at VIII. D.
204 Id. at III. B.
205 COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE, supra note 178 at VIII A. R
206 Id. at VIII D.
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ests, so there is a need for careful oversight to ensure industry-made stan-
dards still comply with IHRL.207
v. Redress
On paper, the ICoC seems to provide good redress options, as it
enables review and follow-up on PSC human rights compliance and an
avenue for third-party complaints.208 The ICoC also contains a welcome
commitment on the part of PSCs “to cooperate in good faith with
national and international authorities exercising proper jurisdiction, in
particular with regard to national and international investigations of vio-
lations of national and international criminal law, of violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, or of human rights abuses.”209 However, as
previously noted, the ICoCA is too reliant on third parties for remedial
activities and its own remedial mechanism lacks predictability and clarity.
Many commentators have criticized the approach the ICoC takes to
remedy. Rona argues that the voluntary nature of the ICoC means that it
cannot ensure that all PSCs are covered by it.210 The U.N. Working
Group on the use of mercenaries maintained that while the approach of
the ICoC was “useful,” it was an insufficient mechanism to regulate and
monitor the activities of PSCs.211 Hoppe and Quirico argue that a code of
conduct cannot be effective if both the act of committing to a code and
compliance with it are entirely voluntary and breaches remain without
consequence.212 This last criticism is not entirely well founded, as
breaches can result in a loss of certification to the ICoC and suspension
and termination of membership of the ICoCA, although admittedly this
will do little to remedy individual violations. Ja¨gers, in contrast, argues
that even voluntary commitments may ultimately have legal effect, for
example, by being included in contracts.213
Before the ICoC was drafted, Nils Rosemann proposed that states
should make compliance with any international code a condition for
awarding contracts to PSCs.214 This is starting to happen in practice, with
207 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 204-05. R
208 The International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA): Core documents,
Frequently Asked Questions, Membership Requirements, INT’L CODE CONDUCT ASS’N
1, 49 (2014), https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA%20Brochure-Online
Designed.pdf.
209 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 133, at 3. R
210 Rona, supra note 113, at 341-42. R
211 Go´mez del Prado, Mercenaries, supra note 117, at 17. R
212 Hoppe & Quirico, supra note 131, at 373. R
213 Id.; Ja¨gers, supra note 37, at 82. R
214 Nils Rosemann, Code of Conduct: Tool for Self-Regulation for Private Military
and Security Companies, 15 GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES 1, 39 (2008) http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/94781/
ipublicationdocument_singledocument/5af67983-6392-472a-b4aa-ec6fd3c04d82/en/oc
casional_15.pdf.
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the U.S., U.K., and U.N. all making compliance with the ICoC a pre-
condition for awarding contracts.215 Thus, suspension or exclusion from
the ICoCA could have a significant impact on a company’s procurement
eligibility, making it, in theory at least, a strong driver for compliance.216
However, using the market to regulate depends on clients actually val-
uing human rights and having sufficient market power to make compli-
ance with the ICoC a factor that firms compete on,217 which may not be
the case in practice. Many governments have renewed contracts with
PSCs even while the companies were associated with significant human
rights abuses and scandals.218 Furthermore, not all states will follow the
lead of the U.S. and U.K., and lucrative contracts may be available where
human rights are less of a concern, as is the case in China, Saudi Arabia,
and Russia.219 While award, renewal, and termination of public contracts
are important means of regulating,220 relying on market forces alone as
the basis for regulation is not going to be sufficient and has not worked in
the past.221 Beyond suspension and termination of membership, the
ICoCA’s punitive measures are limited, and, while it can engage in medi-
ation, the ICoCA does not have the power to bestow specific awards on
the parties to a complaint,222 which limits the effectiveness of its redress
apparatus.
vi. Preliminary Findings
Overall, the ICoC has introduced some extremely positive develop-
ments, but suffers from some debilitating shortcomings. On the positive
side, the multi-stakeholder approach adopted by the ICoC is welcome
and the combination of state buy-in, CSO oversight, and PSC support has
great potential to properly regulate the industry. The multi-faceted
approach to regulation, which includes certification, reporting, and moni-
toring, is also useful, and certification could play a powerful role in
homogenizing standards within the industry. Jose´ L. Gomez del Prado
wisely cautions against rushing to judgment of the ICoC though, noting it
215 Shah, supra note 125, at 2565. R
216 Meg Roggensack, U.S. Legislative and Regulatory Developments and the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: Filling the
Accountability Gap, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 203, 204 (2013).
217 Hoppe & Quirico, supra note 131, at 375. R
218 Cusumano, supra note 116, at 23. R
219 Shah, supra note 125, at 2565-6. R
220 Cusumano, supra note 116, at 22. R
221 Hoppe & Quirico, supra note 131, at 377; SINGER, supra note 35, at 21-22; R
White, supra note 155, at 251. R
222 ICoCA Articles of Association, supra note 135, at art. 13.2.5. R
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is a document of “good intentions” and many of the factors to oversee the
ICoC still need to be established.223
There are a number of shortcomings that reduce the effectiveness of
the ICoCA as a remedial mechanism. While the ICoCA has the power
and mandate to identify and investigate suspected human rights abuses,
there are clear concerns about its capacity to fulfill this mandate. Equally,
although the ICoCA has been refreshingly transparent in its activities
thus far, the confidentiality and non-disclosure rules surrounding the
reporting and complaints processes are a cause for concern. The remedial
mechanism itself lacks predictability and transparency. The requirement
that complainants exhaust other avenues of redress before coming to the
ICoCA means it is unlikely to provide swift remedies. The fact that the
ICoC relies so heavily on external factors, from groups offering certifica-
tion services to external remedial mechanisms, leaves its effectiveness
worryingly at the mercy of these third parties. Furthermore, enforcement
remains a significant stumbling block, with market forces unlikely to ade-
quately regulate the PSC industry and the remedial mechanism itself
offering limited sanctions and redress where violations are identified. It is
difficult to see how the complaints procedure and in-field assessments
will engender compliance with the ICoC without any punitive mecha-
nisms.224 In sum, the ICoCA demonstrates a very limited capacity to
address individual complaints concerning human rights abuses, an over-
reliance on external grievance mechanisms and, arguably, a dispropor-
tionate focus on procedural compliance of PSCs with the ICoC rather
than substantive compliance with international human rights law and
international humanitarian law. While the ICoC has a great deal of prom-
ise, at present, it is far from providing an effective remedy for victims of
human rights abuses at the hands of PSCs.
IV. STATE LEVEL MECHANISMS
A. State-based Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms
The U.N. Guiding Principles declare that states should provide “effec-
tive and appropriate” non-judicial mechanisms alongside judicial mecha-
nisms as part of a comprehensive state-based system.225 Non-judicial
mechanisms include ombudsmen processes and other national human
rights institutions, with a steady growth in these types of mechanisms
recently.226 The mechanisms are often customized to address specific
223 Jose´ L. Go´mez del Prado, A United Nations Instrument to Regulate and Monitor
Private Military and Security Contractors, 1 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 36
(2011).
224 Shah, supra note 125, at 2564. R
225 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 24. R
226 Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Coalition, Protecting Rights, Repairing
Harm: How State-Based Non-Judicial Mechanisms Can Help Fill Gaps in Existing
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areas and complaint types, such as non-discrimination, and can therefore
offer more tailored solutions to human rights issues than more generic
mechanisms are able to provide. The mechanisms play an “essential role”
in complementing and supplementing judicial mechanisms.227 The mecha-
nisms complement and supplement judicial mechanisms in a number of
ways, such as by identifying systemic problems, making recommendations
for law reforms, and clarifying standards through practice, which can
inform legal standards further down the line.228
Overall, non-judicial mechanisms tend to be more accessible, more
flexible, and less costly ways of resolving disputes than resorting to judi-
cial remedies.229 These processes also often rely on mediation as a means
of resolution, which companies are more comfortable and familiar with
when compared to adversarial judicial processes. However, the corollary
is that these mechanisms also tend to be less transparent and less inde-
pendent than judicial mechanisms and can suffer from problems with
enforcement.230 This can discourage non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) from utilizing non-judicial mechanisms; but the fact that these
mechanisms operate under a threat of judicial action in practice tends to
encourage the parties to seek an acceptable outcome.231 In the following
section we will examine the efficacy of one of the most ubiquitous non-
judicial mechanisms: the National Contact Points (“NCPs”) system,
which implements the OECD Guidelines governing multinational enter-
prises (“MNEs”).
B. Case Study: National Contact Points
The OECD first introduced guidelines governing MNEs in the 1970s
and has updated them a number of times.232 In 2011, the OECD incorpo-
Frameworks for the Protection of Human Rights of People Affected by Corporate
Activities, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. 1, 10 (2010), http://business-humanrights.org/
sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie/core-submission-to-ruggie-nov-2010.pdf.
227 U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 24. R
228 Caroline Rees, Access to Remedies for Corporate Human Rights Impacts:
Improving Non-Judicial Mechanisms: Report of a Multi-Stakeholder Workshop,
(Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Gov’t, Harvard
Univ., Report No. 32, 2008), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/
report_32_consultation_report_november_08.pdf.; Corporate Responsibility (CORE)
Coalition, supra note 226, at 12. R
229 Id.at 1.
230 Id. at 4.
231 Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies
and their Stakeholders, supra note 26, at 1-2. R
232 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, TRADE UNION ADVISORY
COMM. 1, 4 (2012), http://www.tuacoecdmneguidelines.org/Docs/TradeUnionGuide
.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN103.txt unknown Seq: 32  7-FEB-17 13:08
100 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:69
rated human rights standards.233 Chapter IV of the Guidelines state that
MNEs and other business enterprises should “respect human rights” with
the aim to “avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”234
and that they should have a human rights policy.235 The MNEs are also
obliged to ensure that they “carry out human rights due diligence appro-
priate to their size, the nature and context of operations and the severity
of the risks of adverse human rights impacts.”236
The Guidelines oblige states to establish NCPs, which are meant to
“further the implementation of the Guidelines.”237 The role of these
NCPs ranges from providing information and raising awareness of Guide-
lines to handling enquiries.238 However, the most interesting aspect of
this mechanism for our present purpose is its role in dealing with “specific
instances.”239 A “specific instance” is the official term for a case or com-
plaint about a company’s alleged breach of the Guidelines.240 The focus
of this procedure is to resolve complaints through mediation and concilia-
tion.241 Many civil society organizations, like NGOs and trade unions,
have raised complaints about human rights violations through this mecha-
nism.242 The addition of Chapter IV to the OECD Guidelines has
expanded the scope of potential human rights complaints to NCPs as the
Guidelines “now include all internationally recognized rights, not merely
those a host government has ratified.”243
Specific instances are handled in three stages. First, once a complaint is
formally submitted to the NCP, the NCP carries out an initial assessment
233 See generally OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinat’l Enterprises, OECD
ILIBRARY (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines].
234 Id. at 31; see also U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 3, at 13. R
235 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 31; see also U.N. Guiding Principles, R
supra note 3, at 15. R
236 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 20. R
237 Id. at 3.
238 Id. at 68.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 72.
241 Id. at 68.
242 Since 2012, after the 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines, NGOs have filed
105 complaints, 84 of which concerned alleged human rights violations. See Antony
Crockett, Human Rights Complaints Against Multinationals Increasing, HERBERT
SMITH FREEHILLS (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-
thinking/human-rights-complaints-against-multinationals-increasing.
243 John Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges 1,
14 (Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative, John F. Kennedy School of Gov’t, Harvard
Univ., Working Paper No. 66, 2015), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/index.php/content/
download/76202/1711396/version/1/file/workingpaper66.pdf.
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to determine if the case warrants further examination.244 If the NCP
determines that the complaint warrants further scrutiny, it will offer its
“good offices” to the parties.245 Second, the NCP brings the parties
together and tries to resolve the complaint through mediation and concil-
iation.246 The NCP can seek “advice from relevant authorities, and/or
representatives of the business community, worker organizations, other
NGOs organizations, and relevant experts,”247 in attempting to resolve
the issues raised. Third, the NCP can issue a final statement on the spe-
cific instance, which should summarize the alleged breaches and detail
the NCP’s dealings with the case.248 In this statement, the NCP can con-
clude that the issues raised do not warrant further consideration.249 The
terms of any agreement reached by the parties will only be disclosed
when both parties agree.250 The NCP may also decide to discontinue its
investigation when a party to the complaint refuses to engage in the
process.251
One of the key benefits offered by the OECD Guidelines system is that
it applies to corporations not only in the OECD states, but also world-
wide, meaning that the OECD Guidelines extend to territories of non-
OECD states where the corporations registered in the OECD member
state operate.252 This gives the Guidelines global influence and the poten-
tial to reach into the supply chains of corporations operating transnation-
ally. The network of contact points and the possibility of consulting NCPs
in other states to assist in transnational violations is also a helpful feature
of this system.253 The Guidelines also cover main areas of responsible
business conduct, such as human rights, industrial and employment rela-
tions, and environmental impacts.254 The Guidelines have the potential to
be a powerful mechanism because the NCPs have the capacity to issue
public final statements and recommendations, which can have a signifi-
cant impact on the reputations of companies.255 The Guidelines them-
244 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 72. R
245 Id. at 72.
246 Id.
247 Id.




252 Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical
Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 4 HANSE L. REV. 71,
78 (2008); Juan Carlos Ochoa Sanchez, The Roles and Powers of the OECD National
Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation, 84 NORDIC J. INT’L L.
89, 91 (2015).
253 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 72. R
254 Id. at 4.
255 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 90-91. R
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selves refer to a number of the effectiveness criteria already identified
above. The NCPs are, for example, meant to resolve issues in a manner
that is impartial, predictable, equitable, and compatible with the princi-
ples and standards of the Guidelines.256 The NCPs are supposed to
ensure visibility, accessibility, transparency, and accountability in their
work and deal with issues in an efficient and timely manner, in accor-
dance with applicable law.257
i. Investigation and Fact-Finding
The NCPs have a diverse role and a great deal of flexibility is left to the
states as to how the NCPs are organized.258 However, these factors gener-
ate problems with ensuring the independence and impartiality of the
body. While each NCP is meant to be functionally equivalent,259 many
authors have noted that the effectiveness of the NCP system in dealing
with specific instance procedures and monitoring is largely dependent on
its structure, which is left to the discretion of the contracting states.260
Because of this, there is a general lack of coherence and consistency in
the organization of the NCPs.261 Many NCPs are rooted in government
departments.262 This is a clear conflict of interest and generates questions
over the objective impartiality of NCPs, given that the same department
is simultaneously responsible for promoting the interests of national com-
panies and acting as an impartial assessor of company behavior.263
256 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 72. R
257 Id. at 71.
258 Id.
259 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 95; OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 78. R
260 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 211. There is a breakdown of the organization R
structures of all of the NCPs in the 2014 Annual Report – OECD. Annual Report on
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2014: Responsible Business.
Conduct by Sector, OECD ILIBRARY 1, 19-20 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/mne-
2014-en [hereinafter Annual Report].
261 Id.
262 Sorcha MacLeod & Scarlett McArdle, International Responsibility and
Accountability of the Corporation: International Initiatives for Holding Corporations
to Account and their Viability with regard to Private Military and Security Companies
13 (Acad. Eur. L., Working Paper No. 29, 2009), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han
dle/1814/13575/AEL_2009_29.pdf?sequence=1. The NCPs are mainly located within
governmental departments in charge of economic and financial issues, or of foreign
affairs. See Annual Report, supra note 250, at 19-20.
263 Evaristus Oshionebo, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development of Natural Resources: Real Solutions or
Window Dressing, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 545, 577-78 (2013); Conference
Report, OECD-ILO Conference on Corp. Soc. Responsibility, Review of NCP
Performance: Key Findings 3, 13 (June 23-24, 2008), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/40807797.pdf [hereinafter Review of NCP Performance].
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The fact-finding activities of the NCPs have also been a cause for con-
cern. There are questions over the capacity of many NCPs to engage in
fact-finding activities. For example, the Mexican and American NCPs do
not conduct thorough examinations of the facts before issuing final state-
ments when a party does not agree to mediation or no agreement has
been reached.264 By contrast, both the Norwegian and U.K. NCPs’ regu-
lations empower them to conduct a thorough investigation before issuing
a final statement in the same circumstances.265 NCPs should have clear
authority to conduct a thorough examination.266 They should have the
capacity to determine the facts or identify perpetrators. However, OECD
Watch has argued that even when NCPs do investigate, the standard of
proof demanded by NCPs is often unduly high and inconsistent.267 NCPs
are advised to determine whether a complaint raises a bona fide issue and
whether the issue is “material and substantiated,” but the Procedural
Guidance does not define “substantiated,” which has led to widely vary-
ing interpretations by different NCPs.268
ii. Accessibility
Non-judicial remedies are generally more accessible and cheaper than
judicial remedies, as we noted above. However, barriers to accessibility
can still exist. The OECD Guidelines, which apply to MNEs, recommend
that NCPs should be properly resourced to carry out their work: “adher-
ing countries shall make available human and financial resources to their
National Contact Points so that they can effectively fulfill their responsi-
bilities, taking into account internal budget priorities and practices.”269
Yet, in practice, the majority of NCPs appear to be under-resourced for
the jobs they are expected to carry out.270 For example, a survey of NCPs
in 2014 revealed that out of the forty-five NCPs surveyed, twenty-five had
no allocated budgets for their NCPs, while ten had no dedicated members
of staff working on NCP issues, even on a part-time basis.271 An array of
accessibility issues can arise when a complainant from outside an OECD
264 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 98. R
265 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 103-4; Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 580-81; R
Cernic also notes a high degree of inconsistency in how these powers are used in
practice. Letnar Cernic, supra note 252, at 86. R
266 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 108. R
267 CAITLIN DANIEL ET AL., REMEDY REMAINS RARE: AN ANALYSIS OF 15
YEARS OF NCP CASES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO REMEDY
FOR VICTIMS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 22 (2015).
268 Id. at 24; Letnar Cernic, supra note 252, at 85. R
269 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 68. R
270 PATRICIA FEENEY, THE MODEL NATIONAL CONTACT POINT (MNCP):
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING AND HARMONIZING THE PROCEDURES OF THE
NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 8 (2007).
271 Annual Report, supra note 260, at 23. R
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country wishes to complain about a PSC domiciled in an OECD country,
including linguistic barriers, difficulties with attending mediation sessions,
travel and visa issues, and the lack of expertise.272 The lack of resources
available to NCPs can exacerbate these accessibility issues, as NCPs have
in the past required impecunious complainants to pay for services that are
a necessary part of the complaint process and should be provided by the
mechanism itself, such as the translation of documents and travel to
mediation meetings.273 The cost of bringing a claim under the NCP spe-
cific instance procedure has been estimated to amount to an average of
100 thousand British Pounds per claim,274 which clearly impacts the
accessibility of the procedure as a whole. Overall, when one considers the
diversity of complaints NCPs may have to handle, including claims on
environmental law, human rights, financial services, labor relations, etc.,
it is difficult to see how poorly resourced NCPs could possibly cover all of
these disparate areas successfully.
iii. Speed
The MNE Guidelines indicate that NCPs should deal with specific
instances in a timely manner.275 Some further guidance on time is pro-
vided in the commentary on the implementation procedures and NCPs
should provide information to the parties on the indicative timeframes
that will be followed by the NCP.276 There are no hard and fast rules
regarding times, but in general the OECD recommends that the initial
assessment of a specific instance should be completed within three
months of receipt.277 In practice it regularly takes the NCPs too long to
decide admissibility issues, and in some cases the delays are quite exces-
sive. For instance, the Irish NCP spent over three years on initial assess-
ment in one case.278 As a general principle, NCPs should strive to
conclude the procedure within twelve months from receipt of the specific
instance.279 Yet, again in practice, specific instances are taking longer to
conclude. Most cases that make it to mediation remain pending before
the NCP for at least one to two years, and OECD Watch noted that one
272 Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 582. R
273 Daniel et al., supra note 267, at 21-22. R
274 JORIS OLDENZIEL ET AL., 10 YEARS ON: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF
THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES TO RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS CONDUCT 11 (2015).
275 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 72. R
276 Id. at 80.
277 Id. at 87.
278 OECD WATCH, ASSESSMENT OF NCP PERFORMANCE IN THE 2013-2014
IMPLEMENTATION CYCLE 22 (2014) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF NCP
PERFORMANCE].
279 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 87. R
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case has been pending for over six years.280 While some of these are
extreme examples and the conduct of the parties will clearly have a bear-
ing on the length of time it takes to remedy, when significant delays arise
the NCPs have other options other than waiting on the parties. For exam-
ple, the NCPs could appoint a dedicated mediator to handle the case or
issue a final statement with recommendations based on existing informa-
tion, but this does not typically happen in practice.
iv. Transparency
The OECD Guidelines state that the NCPs should be “proactive” to
ensure the Guidelines are well known and understood, especially by
national business representatives.281 However, the limited uptake of the
specific instance procedure, with only thirty-one out of forty-two NCPs
actually having dealt with a specific instance and considerable variations
in the workloads of different NCPs,282 reveals that knowledge of the NCP
system is inconsistent. The OECD Guidelines also encourage transparent
information disclosure, stipulating that the results of specific instances
should be made publicly available.283 In practice this is far from univer-
sally observed. From 2013 to 2014, for example, while NCPs published
final statements in twenty-eight different specific instances, three others
were not published.284 Levels of transparency also vary from country to
country with some NCPs, particularly the U.S. NCP, appearing reluctant
to prepare and publish final statements.285 As of 2013, the U.S. NCP had
only issued a statement or report on three of the thirty-two specific
instances that arose.286 Even when the results are disclosed, the docu-
ments issued by NCPs can be very unclear. In some cases the names of
the parties to specific instances are not disclosed.287 Some NGOs have
criticized these confidentiality measures within the mediation process,
especially where the matters dealt with are of public interest.288 In other
instances, the documents disclosed fail to clearly identify the issue which
gave rise to the complaint in the first place.289 This limited transparency
as to outcomes also negatively impacts public scrutiny of the activities of
280 ASSESSMENT OF NCP PERFORMANCE, supra note 278, at 22. R
281 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 69. R
282 Leyla Davarnejad, In the Shadow of Soft Law: The Handling of Corporate
Social Responsibility Disputes under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 351, 366 (2011).
283 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 73. R
284 Annual Report, supra note 260, at 27. R
285 Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 579. R
286 Id. at 579-80.
287 MacLeod & McArdle, supra note 262, at 14. R
288 Claes Cronstedt & Robert C. Thompson, An International Arbitration Tribunal
on Business and Human Rights, LAWYERS FOR BETTER BUS. 1, 7 (2015), http://www
.l4bb.org/news/TribunalV5B.pdf.
289 Davarnejad, supra note 282, at 367. R
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NCPs and, in particular, whether they are being consistent in how they
handle specific instances.290
v. Redress
The variety of redress available and the adequacy and prompt payment
of compensation are two key factors determining the effectiveness of
redress. The NCP system arguably satisfies the first criterion by offering
mediation, which can create bespoke solutions to particular problems and
offer more flexibility, in terms of outcomes, than a court order. The
OECD has been keen to stress that mediation activities among the NCPs
are increasing and that the capacity of the NCPs to facilitate mediation
and dialogue is improving.291 However, a key shortcoming of the NCP
system is its inability to provide compensation and make specific awards
on that front.292
A further criterion of effective redress is an ability to demand general
and specific measures of redress and monitor implementation of the out-
comes. The final statements of NCPs and mediation agreements offer a
means through which NCPs can undertake these activities. However, in
practice, many NCPs refuse to make a statement on whether or not the
Guidelines have been breached in the specific instance before them.293
Furthermore, they rarely follow up on whether the agreements have been
implemented or recommendations followed,294 even though this is
expressly recommended by the U.N. Guiding Principles.295 When NCPs
do issue final statements, these often aim to protect companies rather
than drawing a clear distinction between acceptable and unacceptable
corporate conduct.296 In the rare instances that NCPs find that the Guide-
lines have been infringed, NCPs cannot impose any sanction on the com-
pany, as the companies themselves are not legally obliged to abide by the
Guidelines, which are merely recommendations.297 In practice, NCPs
should determine whether there has been a breach of the Guidelines and
offer recommendations to the companies on how to better implement the
Guidelines in future.298 There is value in establishing a breach of the
290 Id. at 368.
291 Annual Report, supra note 260, at 18. R
292 Daniel Augenstein, Study of the Legal Framework on Hum. Rts. and the Env’t
Applicable to European Enterprises Operating Outside the European Union, UNIV.
EDINBURGH REP. 1, 78 (2015), http://en.frankbold.org/sites/default/files/tema/101025_
ec_study_final_report_en_0.pdf; Davarnejad, supra note 282, at 364. R
293 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 98, 105-06; Oshionebo, supra note 253, at R
581.
294 OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 23. R
295 See U.N. General Principles, supra note 3. R
296 FEENEY, supra note 270, at 5. R
297 Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 573, 582. R
298 OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 22. R
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Guidelines and naming and shaming the perpetrator.299 Overall, Mac-
Leod and McArdle argue that the NCP procedure does not provide for
punishment and redress and can, at best, only act as a deterrent.300 As a
result, Seiberth concludes that the specific instance procedure cannot be
an effective remedy in the context of PSC activities.301
vi. Complaints Against PSCs
The specific instance procedure does not handle a large number of
complaints when compared to the potential human rights abuses carried
out by companies throughout the world. In 2014, for example, there were
only thirty-four specific instances brought before the entire network of
NCPs.302 Of these, a very small number were complaints lodged against
PSCs, with only three involving allegations of insufficient human rights
due diligence by companies in the security sector.303 Despite the limited
number, it appears that these types of cases are particularly difficult for
NCPs to deal with. The 2014 Annual Report stated:
NCPs often face complaints that transcend many borders and
encounter multiple conflicting interests from business, government,
and stakeholders. For example, during the 2013-2014 reporting
period three allegations of insufficient human rights due diligence by
companies in the security sector were raised, all of which involved
sensitive information and compelled NCPs to carefully examine both
the obligations and boundaries of their responsibility.304
This appears to be a long running issue for the NCPs going back to the
early 2000s with a specific instance complaint against a U.K.-based PSC
named Avient. This complaint was dealt with prior to the introduction of
the specific chapter of the Guidelines on human rights in 2011.305 The
Guidelines at that time, however, did contain a clause, which stated that
“[enterprises should] respect the human rights of those affected by their
activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations
and commitments.”306 The U.N. Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) reported in 2002 that Avient was one of
299 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 110-11; OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, R
at 22.
300 MacLeod & McArdle, supra note 262, at 15. R
301 SEIBERTH, supra note 132, at 211. R
302 Annual Report, supra note 260, at 18. R
303 Id. at 41.
304 Id. at 18.
305 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 31-34. R
306 2011 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
Comparative Table of Changes Made to the 2000 Text, OECD 3, 13 (2011), https://
www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/49744860.pdf.
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a number of companies fueling the conflict in the DRC.307 It was alleged
that Avient provided military supplies to the Congolese Army and
Zimbabwean Defense Forces, provided crews for aircraft that engaged in
indiscriminate bombing and had brokered the sale of military equipment
to parties to the conflict.308 The report stated that Avient was suspected
of violating the OECD Guidelines and called on governments to investi-
gate.309 As a result, the U.K. NCP opened a specific instance.
The NCP’s subsequent actions have been widely criticized. First, it
refused to allow an NGO, Rights and Accountability in Development
(“RAID”), to participate in the complaint or to consider RAID’s com-
plaint about Avient in parallel with the U.N. panel’s complaint.310 Sec-
ond, although the NCP claimed that “the Panel supplied very little
evidence to support the allegations made,”311 the NCP did not seem to
make any concerted effort to gather evidence itself or pursue leads. The
evidence against Avient included bank records linking it to a notorious
arms dealer, a contract signed by a director of Avient and Joseph Kabila,
the President of the DRC, to provide a crew to operate aircraft owned by
the Congolese Air Force.312 This crew would “operate on behalf of the
Military on Operational Missions” and were “operating along and behind
enemy lines in support of Ground Troops and against the invading
forces.”313 OECD Watch also claims that the NCP had a letter from the
DRC Air Force in its possession, which clearly implicated Avient in mili-
tary campaigns on behalf of the DRC government.314 Third, the final
statement issued by the NCP was deeply problematic as it “essentially
record[ed] Avient’s response to the allegations.”315 The complaint that
307 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S.C.
Rep. 2002/1146, para. 55, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Final
Report].
308 Final Statement, OECD United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement
on Avient at 1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_40/148/
at_download/file [hereafter Statement on Avient].
309 Final Report, supra note 307, at para. 178. R
310 Specific Instance Request, Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID),
AVIENT Ltd. 2 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_40/380/at_download/
file; OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 32. Involving NGOs in the activities of the R
NCPs has been an ongoing problem at the OECD. MacLeod & McArdle, supra note
262, at 11-12. R
311 Statement on Avient, supra note 308, at 2. R
312 Final Report, supra note 307, at 12; Antony Barnett & Paul Harris, How a R
perfect English gent in a rural idyll profits from a bloody African war, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 24, 2002), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/politics.uk; Rights
and Accountability in Development (RAID), supra note 310, at 1. R
313 Id. at 2-3.
314 OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 32. R
315 Id..
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Avient had participated in indiscriminate bombing raids in the DRC was
not even addressed by the NCP in the final statement.316 The statement
did not make a conclusion as to whether the allegations were true or not,
or whether the Guidelines had been breached.317 Fourth, the recommen-
dations of the NCP were particularly insipid and vague and offered no
practical benefit to the company or meaningful guidance on how the com-
pany should change its commercial activity.318 Avient was invited, for
example, to carefully consider the recommendation that it should “con-
tribute to economic, social and environmental progress with a view to
achieving sustainable development.”319 Thus, many of the shortcomings
in effectiveness, such as ineffectual investigation, a weak final statement,
and problems with accessibility of the remedy, are all evident in this
example.
Although improvements have been made to the OECD Guidelines and
the operations of the NCPs themselves since,320 even recent NCP activity
on PSCs has been inconsistent. In February 2013, a number of NGOs
submitted a complaint against a company named Trovicor, which offers
intelligence solutions to states.321 It was alleged that Trovicor had taken
over maintenance responsibilities for mass surveillance technology for
the Bahraini government in 2009, which in turn contributed to human
rights violations by the Bahraini state.322 The complainants alleged that
the Bahraini government was using German-made surveillance technol-
ogy to target and suppress pro-democracy activists.323 The technology
was, in their view, instrumental in violations of the right to privacy, free
expression, freedom of association, liberty and security of the person, and
the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.324
A number of problems with effectiveness are identifiable in this spe-
cific instance. First, the initial assessment of the complaint took six
316 Statement on Avient, supra note 308, at 2. R
317 Id.
318 Daniel Leader, Business and Human Rights - Time to Hold Companies to
Account, 8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 447, 459 (2008).
319 Id.
320 MacLeod & McArdle, supra note 262, at 13. R
321 About Us, TROVICOR (last visited Oct. 30, 2016), http://trovicor.com/wp-
content/uploads/trovicor-corporate-brochure-en.pdf.
322 Final Statement, German National Contact Point, Statement on Trovicor (May
21, 2014), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/oecd-ac-final-statement-ecchr,
property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf [hereinafter Statement on
Trovicor].
323 German OECD NCP Unwilling to Investigate Role of German Company in
Human Rights Violations in Bahrain, PRIVACY INT’L. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www
.privacyinternational.org/?qNode/169.
324 Id.
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months longer than the indicated timeframe.325 Second, the problems
with fact-finding and investigation identified above are evident. Trovicor
refused to provide “information on business relations meaning that it was
impossible to determine whether the company had any business relations
with Bahrain.”326 This led the NCP to reject the complaint that Trovicor
was partly responsible for the violations of human rights in Bahrain. The
complainants claimed they had provided sufficient information to sub-
stantiate the claim and refused to engage in mediation proposed by the
NCP to resolve the complaint.327 This ultimately led the NCP to close the
case. Third, the NCP accepted that the complaint that Trovicor did not
operate a management system to analyze human rights risks of its busi-
ness activities warranted further examination, but did not make any rec-
ommendations in the final statement with regard to this apparent
shortcoming.328
Interestingly, a very similar complaint was made to the U.K. NCP,
which highlights the inconsistencies in the approach different NCPs take
to similar complaints. In the U.K., a number of NGOs complained that a
company called Gamma International had supplied a spyware product to
agencies of the Bahrain government, which had used it to target pro-
democracy activists.329 The spyware infiltrated their electronic devices
and was used to track their communications.330 Again the NCP failed to
provide a swift remedy, mediating the case for almost seventeen
months.331 In a similar vein to Trovicor, Gamma refused to confirm or
deny to which states they supplied the software.332 Even though neither
party provided direct evidence proving or disproving the claims, the com-
plainants made a strong circumstantial case and the U.K. NCP continued
the process.333 When mediation eventually failed, the NCP notified the
parties that it would continue examining the complaint.334 In its final
statement, despite its inability to verify key facts relating to the com-
plaint, the NCP concluded that “based on the information reviewed and
shared by the U.K. NCP, the NCP considers that it is reasonably certain
325 ASSESSMENT OF NCP PERFORMANCE, supra note 278, at 31-32. R
326 Statement on Trovicor, supra note 322, at 1. R
327 Id. at 2.
328 Id. at 1.
329 Initial Assessment, United Kingdom National Contact Point, Initial
Assessment by the UK National Contact Point: Complaint from Privacy International
and Others against Gamma International UK Ltd, at 2 (June 2013), https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208112/bis-13-947-
complaint-from-privacy-international-and-others-against-gamma-international-uk-ltd
.pdf [hereinafter Initial Assessment].
330 Id. at 2.
331 ASSESSMENT OF NCP PERFORMANCE, supra note 278, at 22. R
332 Initial Assessment, supra note 329, at 8. R
333 Id.
334 Id. at 6.
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that the product reported by the activists as having been sent to them was
Gamma’s.”335 It went on to conclude that Gamma International U.K.
Limited had not acted consistently with provisions of the OECD Guide-
lines requiring enterprises to carry out appropriate due diligence, to
encourage business partners to observe the Guidelines, to have a policy
commitment to respect human rights, and to provide for or cooperate
through processes to remediate human rights impacts.336
These two cases perfectly illustrate some of the key shortcomings in the
effectiveness of the NCP process. The first and most obvious shortcoming
is that the complaint mechanism remains inconsistent. When virtually
identical complaints are presented to two different NCPs, the results were
wildly different. Much of this has to do with the NCPs willingness to
engage in proprio motu fact-finding, which corresponds with the issue
identified earlier in the Avient case and shows the problem persists to this
day. The fact that PSCs often operate in very challenging environments
where the rule of law is weak will likely mean that the fact-finding capac-
ity of the NCPs is further impaired. The OECD Guidelines, for example,
recommend contacting embassies and government officials in third states
in their investigations.337 However, this will be difficult in the context of
an ongoing conflict. Field visits, which some NCPs have been known to
undertake,338 seem equally challenging and highly unlikely. Furthermore
NCPs are unable to compel disclosure of information that is necessary for
them to carry out their work.339 There is a need for further guidance on
these issues and Cernic argues that recommendations should be drafted
as to what fact-finding activities the parties can expect the NCP to under-
take once a specific instance has been deemed admissible.340
Another severe shortcoming of this process is the extent to which it
depends on the voluntary participation of companies and NGOs. When
either party does not fully engage, it can result in the process stalling or
ending completely. Some NCPs simply drop cases where the company
limits its engagement in some way, such as by declining to participate in
mediation.341 The NCPs’ activities should not be completely dependent
on voluntary participation and even if a party declines to participate, the
NCP should still carry out an investigation. As it stands there is no real
335 Final Statement, OECD United Kingdom National Contact Point, Privacy
International & Gamma International UK Ltd: Final Statement After Examination of




336 Id. at 16.
337 OECD Guidelines, supra note 233, at 86. R
338 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 105. R
339 Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 570; OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 50. R
340 Letnar Cernic, supra note 252, at 86. R
341 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 98-100. R
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incentive for companies to submit themselves to the NCP process when
the result of their non-engagement is that the case is dropped without
further comment.342 There are no consequences for companies who fail to
comply with the Guidelines or refuse to engage in mediation,343 which
severely undermines the capacity of the NCP to deliver remedies. The
authority to conduct a thorough examination of the facts, and to make a
conclusion on whether or not the concerned company has breached the
Guidelines should be standard powers among all NCPs.344 Exercising this
power would also incentivize company participation as the reputational
damage that could arise from an adverse statement generates leverage for
the NCP.
vii. Preliminary Findings
MacLeod and McArdle argue that NCPs are only as effective as their
structure allows and that is certainly the case when it comes to delivering
effective remedies.345 The NCP system undoubtedly has a number of
strengths—it covers a wide range of areas and offers a network of poten-
tial investigators and the prospect of tracking violations through the sup-
ply chain. However, as Ruggie points out, the NCPs have not yet realised
their potential as an effective remedy against corporate human rights
abuse.346 Many NCPs lack sufficient independence from the government
and business to offer a credible outlet for human rights complaints, while
their inadequate investigatory and fact-finding facilities limit their overall
effectiveness, especially where violations by PSCs are concerned. The
NCPs themselves have conflicting views on what their role and function is
or should be and the desired objective of functional equivalence is far
from realization.347 Amnesty International stated that many NCPs grossly
under-perform and that this is largely due to the defects and shortcom-
ings of the institutional architecture within which NCPs operate.348
OECD Watch for their part noted that NCP handling of specific instances
has been erratic, unpredictable, and largely ineffectual.349 They went on
to state that using the OECD Guidelines is a “timeconsuming [sic],
resource-intensive process that, even in the best case scenario, results in
342 Oshionebo, supra note 263, at 582. R
343 Amnesty International, The 2010-11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises has come to an end: The OECD must now turn into effective
implementation at 2, AMNESTY INT’L. (May 23, 2011), https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/IOR30/001/2011/en/ [2010-11 Update of OECD].
344 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 108. R
345 MacLeod & McArdle, supra note 262, at 12. R
346 John Ruggie, Updating the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 5 (10th
OECD Roundtable on Corp. Resp., Discussion paper, 2010).
347 Ochoa Sanchez, supra note 252, at 114. R
348 2010-11 Update of OECD, supra note 343, at 2. R
349 OLDENZIEL ET AL., supra note 274, at 11. R
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only minor improvements.”350 In light of these criticisms and the analysis
above, we can conclude that the NCP system in general does not cur-
rently provide an effective remedy for human rights abuses perpetrated
by PSCs.
V. CONCLUSION
Non-judicial remedies have the capacity to address human rights viola-
tions in novel and more flexible ways than judicial remedies. They should,
in principle, offer more accessible, cost-effective and quicker remedies.
The ICoC, for example, guarantees remedial mechanisms that are closer
to the victims by making sure each signatory to the ICoC provides a com-
pany-level grievance mechanism. The network of NCPs has the capacity
to bridge gaps between different jurisdictions and the gaps in the over-
sight of different judicial bodies. The ICoCA’s multi-stakeholder
approach ensures a more collegiate approach to solving industry
problems. Additionally, the MNE Guidelines and the ICoC could offer
overarching general standards, which transcend national judicial rules.
Unfortunately, the remedies analyzed here have not lived up to their
potential. Despite some promising attributes, such as the inter-connected-
ness of the NCP system and the multi-stakeholder approach of the
ICoCA, the analysis above shows that each has failed to provide an effec-
tive remedy for human rights violations perpetrated by PSCs.
The remedial mechanisms themselves could be much more effective
with some minor changes in approach and behavior. The NCPs could, for
example, make better use of their fact-finding capacity, by investigating
even where the companies allegedly at fault refuse to co-operate. Their
capacity to issue final statements with recommendations represents one
of the few genuine sources of leverage that the NCP system has over
companies. NCPs could exploit this leverage to name and shame compa-
nies and offer detailed and specific recommendations in furtherance of
human rights.
At the ICoCA increasing the investigatory capacity of the Secretariat
would go some way toward assuaging the doubts about its ability to keep
track of all the companies signing up to the ICoC. At the same time, the
ICoCA should force PSCs to strictly justify any refusals to disclose infor-
mation or measures of confidentiality in its reports to the ICoCA. The
ICoCA could also work on setting out clear parameters for how different
types of complaints will be handled by the ICoCA. These measures
represent the low hanging fruit within the existing structure that could
facilitate greater effectiveness. Deeper institutional reforms could look at
retrofitting the ICoCA with some coercive sanctions or punitive measures
to induce compliance, while the institutional reforms of the NCPs should
350 Id. at 23.
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ensure more resources are made available to the NCPs and greater sepa-
ration between them and government departments.
Overall, the non-judicial remedies examined here have a great deal of
unrealized potential. In their current form and modus operandi they do
not provide effective remedies. But, if some marginal changes to behavior
and form are effected, these non-judicial remedies could make a signifi-
cant difference in holding businesses to account for human rights abuses.
